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UNMARRIED COUPLES AND UNJUST
ENRICHMENT: FROM STATUS TO
CONTRACT AND BACK AGAIN?
Robert C. Casad*
DEAR ABBY: Who should pay for what in a live-in type
relationship?
-THE FEMALE

DEAR FEMALE: In any kind of relationship, the assets, liabilities and responsibilities should be shared 50-50. . . . You might
consider living with this free-loading, well-to-do creep just long
enough to confirm a common law status (under recent court decision), and then sock it to him! 1

In recent years, litigation over property arrangements between unmarried cohabitants has posed some old questions in a
new light and has yielded some new answers. One of the most
intriguing of these questions is whether a cohabitant has a right,
upon dissolution of the relationship, to remuneration for household services rendered during the relationship. A spouse who contributed household services in an actual marriage, of course, may
upon divorce receive a share of the property acquired by the other
spouse during the marriage or may receive a monetary award as
compensation for the contributions made to the other during the
marriage. These are established rights of the marital status.
Unmarried cohabitants, however, traditionally have had no such
rights. The "status" of "concubinage" or meretricious cohabitation afforded neither party any recovery for services rendered to
the other, unless the party seeking recovery was induced to provide services by a mistaken belief that the couple was validly
married (the situation commonly referred to as "putative marriage") or by duress. 2 Recovery has generally been denied under
quasi-contract or constructive-trust theories, since courts have
reasoned that the law will not aid a wrongdoer in an illicit rela• Professor of Law, University of Kansas. A.B. 1950, M.A. 1952, University of
Kansas; J.D. 1957, University of Michigan; S.J.D. 1979, Harvard University.-Ed.
1. Topeka Capital, Sept. 27, 1978, § 1, at 15, col. 4.
2. In some 13 states and the District of Columbia, the institution of common-law
marriage is still in force. If the relationship qualifies as a common-law marriage in those
states, the parties have, upon dissolution, the same rights as parties to a formal, ceremonial marriage. See H. CLARK, DOMESTIC RELATIONS, CASES AND PROBLEMS 67 (1974).
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tionship such as nonmarital cohabitation3 or that a donative intent motivated the services and thus justified the retention of any
benefit deriving from them. 4 Even when couples foresightedly
dealt with the problem by an express contract, courts often found
such contracts, which rested in part on an illegal consideration,
unenforceable. 5 The "taint" of the meretricious association
thwarted virtually all attempts to recover for services-sometimes even for nondomestic services. 6
As the force of the social stigma on "concubinage" or
"meretricious" relationships abates, however, more unmarried
couples cohabit. 7 And as the number of cohabitants increases,
pressure mounts to ascribe to their relationships certain
marriage-like incidents to protect cohabitants from hardship and
injustice when death or renunciation separates them. Courts in
some states have responded by· expressly rejecting the "taint"
doctrine. 8 As the state's interest in condemning immorality
wanes, the way clears for doctrines better designed to accommodate the cohabitants' interests equitably. With "taint" rendered
legally insignificant, the law's concern with unmarried cohabitation generally should be, as with other consensual transfers of
economic value, to protect the parties' reasonable expectations.
3. See, e.g., Sackstaeder v. Kast, 31 Ky. L. Rep. 1304, 105 S.W. 435 (1907); Simpson
v. Normand, 51 La. Ann. 1355, 26 So. 266 (1899); Brown v. Tuttle, 80 Me. 162, 13 A. 583
(1888).

4. E.g., Hill v. Westbrook's Estate, 95 Cal. App. 2d 599,602,213 P.2d 727,729 (1950);
In re Estate of Louis Klemow, 411 Pa. 136, 141, 191 A.2d 365,368 (1963); Willis v. Willie,
48 Wyo. 403, 438, 49 P.2d 670, 681 (1935).
5. See, e.g., Vincent v. Moriarty, 31 App. Div. 484, 492, 52 N.Y.S. 519, 522-23 (1898).
Cf. Brown v. Tuttle, 80 Me. 162, 165, 13 A. 583, 584 (1888) (court would not enforce even
an express contract, had one been made, that furthered an illegal relationship); Traver v.
Naylor, 126 Or. 193, 207, 268 P. 75, 79 (1928) (future cohabitation cannot serve as any
part of the consideration for a promise).
6. See, e.g., Guerin v. Bonaventure, 212 So. 2d 459 (La. App. 1968); Willis v. Willis,
48 Wyo. 403, 438, 49 P.2d 670, 681 (1935).
7. The Bureau of the Census reported that the number of persons sharing living
quarters with an unrelated member of the opposite sex virtually doubled between 1970
and 1977, although the data included resident employees and roomers as well as persona
living in a sexually companionate relationship. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, U.S. DEPT. OF
COMMERCE, CURRENT POPULATION REPORTS, SERIES P-20, No. 306, MARITAL STATUS AND
LMNG ARRANGEMENTS, MARCH 1976, at 4 (1977). These and other data from the report are
discussed in Kay & Amyx, Marvin v. Marvin: Preserving the Options, 65 CAIJF. L. REv.
937, 975 (1977). See also Bruch, Property Rights of De Facto Spouses Including Thoughts
on the Value of Homemakers' Services, 10 FAM. L.Q. 101, 101 n.1 (1976).
8. See Marvin v. Marvin, 18 Cal. 3d 660, 557 P.2d 106, 134 Cal. Rptr. 815 (1976);
Tyranski v. Piggins, 44 Mich. App. 570, 205 N.WJ!d 595 (1973); Carlson v. Olson,_
Minn.-, 256 N.W.2d 249 (1977); Beal v. Beal, 282 Or. 115, 577 P.2d 507 (1978); Latham
v. Latham, 274 Or. 421, 547 P.2d 144 (1976). But see Rehak v. Mathis, 239 Ga. 541, 238
S.E.2d 81 (1977); Keller v. Keller, 220 So. 2d 745 (La. App. 1969).
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Some couples, of course, will draft agreements expressing
their understanding of and expectations about exchanges of economic value in their relatipnship. If a couple has agreed how to
govern the property aspects of their relationship and how to dispose of their property when the relationship ends, the law ought
to help carry out that agreement unless doing so would contravene rules that invalidate similar consensual arrangements between non-cohabitants. If "taint" does not invalidate them, express trust or contract agreements could solve most of the problems of allocating property interests upon the termination of a
relationship and could, in particular, provide some economic
return to a party who works in the home.
However, most couples do not consider the economics of their
relationship paramount when their relationship begins. In fact,
many fear that even mentioning such mundane matters would
debase other, more important, non-economic aspects of their association. Accordingly, cohabitants rarely make comprehensive,
express written agreements ordering their economic relations.
And while a court should honor express oral agreements too, their
existence and contents will usually be difficult to prove, and the
Statute of Frauds and the Dead Man's Statute will sometimes be
insurmountable barriers to enforcing them.
A court might, of course, infer an agreement, but inference
can be an unreliable mechanism for ordering th~ economic relations of unmarried couples. Parties to a standardized commercial
transaction or property transfer can establish implied-in-fact arrangements-contracts or trusts-rather easily, because a normal
expectancy can be imputed to those who do commercial things
in a commercial setting, even though no words pass between
them. But no one has yet articulated the standard expectations
of unmarried couples. This is not to say that no cases have recognized implied-in-fact contracts or resulting trusts in the arrangements of cohabitants. But decisions which do so rest on fairly firm
proof of intentions. 9 Absent such proof, then, one cannot confidently assume that a court will infer an agreement concerning
property from a couple's conduct until the courts have recognized
9. See, e.g., McMillan v. Massie's Exr., 233 Ky. 808, 27 S.W.2d 416 (1930); Orth v.
Wood, 354 Pa. 121, 47 A.2d 140 (1946); Worsche v. Kraning, 353 Pa. 481, 46 A.2d 220
(1946); Poole v. Schicte, 39 Wash. 2d 961, 236 P.2d 1044 (1951); and two cases decided
after Marvin v. Marvin, 18 Cal. 3d 660, 557 P.2d 106, 134 Cal. Rptr. 815 (1976) (for a
discussion of the significance of Marvin, see text at notes 10-20, infra): Carlson v. Olson,
Minn.-, 256 N.W.2d 249 (1977); and Beal v. Beal, 282 Or. 115, 577 P.2d 507
(1978).
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as standard some general features of the relationship of unmarried cohabitants.
Marvin v. Marvin,1° the widely publicized decision of the
California Supreme Court (and perhaps the recent court decision
Dear Abby referred to), suggested one presumption that might
become such a standard feature: that cohabitants intend to deal
fairly with each other. That may sound truistic, but its implications not only could make proving implied-in-fact agreements
easier, but also could significantly influence the development of
restitutionary remedies.
Some periodicals reported the Marvin case as more revolutionary than it really was. 11 The actual holding rested upon the
plaintiff's allegation of an express contract. The Marvin court
merely held that an agreement made during cohabitation to
"'combine their efforts and earnings and ... share equally any
and all property accumulated as a result of their efforts whether
individual or combined' " was enforceable. 12 Thus, Marvin clearly
rejected the view that such contracts are unenforceable, but it
was hardly the first case to do so. 13 The majority opinion did say,
however, that an unmarried cohabitant might also recover on
theories of implied contract, implied partnership or joint venture,
constructive trust, resulting trust, or, under some circumstances,
quantum meruit; it did permit the pl_aintiff to add such claims
on remand if the facts warranted. 14 The far-reaching implications
that some have seen in the Marvin case lie mainly in that dictum.15
Nor is the Marvin opinion revolutionary if it meant by these
suggestions that courts should enforce cohabitants' agreements,
whether express or implied-in-fact from the parties' conduct.
Other cases in other jurisdictions have taken similar positions. 18
But the opinion's tenor strongly suggests that the court was not
thinking only of remedies reeiting on actual contract or trust, express or implied-in-fact; the court also contemplated remedies
10. 18 Cal. 3d 660, 557 P.2d 106, 134 Cal. Rptr. 815 (1976). The Index to Legal
Periodicals shows that to date the Marvin case has been the subject of notes, comments,
or articles in over fifteen different law reviews.
11. See, e.g., 'l'IME, Jan. 10, 1977, at 39 ("[t]he landmark decision •.. states that
cohabitation without marriage gives both parties the right to share property if they separate"); Kay & Amyx, supra note 7, at 954 n.104.
12. 18 Cal. 3d at 666, 557 P.2d at 110, 134 Cal. Rptr. at 819 (quoting the plaintifrs
complaint).
13. See Bruch, supra note 7, at 107-08 and cases cited therein.
14. 18 Cal. 3d at 675, 557 P.2d at 116, 134 Cal. Rptr. at 825.
15. See, e.g., Kay & Amyx, supra note 7; 90 HARv. L. REv. 1708 (1977).
16. See Bruch, supra note 7, at 107-08 and cases cited therein.
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implied-in-law where there had been no actual agreement. The
opinion indicated that courts ought to recognize certain basic
propositions concerning the relationship of unmarried couples
and that "judicial barriers that may stand in the way of a policy
based upon the fulfillment of the reasonable expectations of the
parties to a nonmarital relationship should be removed." 17 It was
in reference to the expectations courts might have about most
cohabitational relationships that the majority endorsed the presumption that cohabitants intend "to deal fairly with each
other." 18 The majority suggested that courts begin fashioning a
law of remedies appropriate to nonmarital relationships, just as
the courts had devised doctrines to deal with "putative" spouses
before legislation19 recognized such persons' rights. Significantly,
the route the California courts took in constructing putativespouse remedies traversed the field of unjust enrichment; the
remedies were, for the most part, restitutionary. 20
If judicially created remedies are made available to unmarried couples in the absence of an agreement, restitution and unjust enrichment principles will probably be the medium. The
plight of a spurned cohabitant who dutifully stayed home and
kept house while the other cohabitant ventured out and acquired
wealth resembles other situations in which unjust enrichment has
been recognized. However, it also differs significantly, and we
must now ask whether those differences should bar some form of
restitution where no agreement allocates property rights between
the cohabitants.
The law of restitution concerns transfers of economic value
from one party to another party who cannot justifiably retain the
net benefit. The courts have developed several remedies in
common-law and equitable actions to effectuate restitution. 21 If
the plaintiff transferred to the defendant specific real, personal,
or intangible property, the plaintiff may recover it in specie if the
17. 18 Cal. 3d at 684, 657 P.2d at 122, 134 Cal. Rptr. at 831.
18. 18 Cal. 3d at 683, 657 P.2d at 121, 134 Cal. Rptr. at 830 (paraphrasing J. Peters'
dissent in Keene v. Keene, 57 Cal. 2d 657, 674, 371 P.2d 329, 339, 21 Cal. Rptr. 593, 603
(1962)).
19. 18 Cal. 3d at 677, 557 P.2d at 118, 134 Cal. Rptr. at 827.
20. See Schneider v. Schneider, 183 Cal. 335, 191 P. 533 (1920); Coats v. Coats, 160
Cal. 671, 118 P. 441 (1911) (the theory of recovery in the preceding two cases is predicated
on the idea that property held in the man's name was in part the product of the woman's
contribution, and it would therefore be unjust to allow him to retain all); Sanguinetti v.
Sanguinetti, 9 Cal. 2d 95, 69 P.2d 845 (1937) (quasi-contract); Lazzarevich v. Lazzarevich,
88 Cal. App. 2d 708, 200 P.2d 49 (1948) (quasi-contract). See generally 4 G. PALMER, LAW
OF fu:sTlTUTION § 18.3 (1978).
21. See generally D. DoBBS, LAw OF REMEDIES § 4.4 (1973).
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defendant cannot justify his retention of it. The plaintiff may
resort to the familiar common-law remedies of replevin and ejectment (or their statutory counterparts) for this purpose. If the
plaintiff cannot recover the object in specie, or perhaps even if he
can, he may alternatively recover a money judgment for its value,
or for the proceeds of its sale, through the common counts of
"money had and received," "goods sold and delivered," or the
like. If the defendant has transferred the object and used the
proceeds to acquire another asset, the plaintiff may in some circumstances claim the substitute asset in specie, an interest in it,
or its proceeds, through equitable principles of "tracing" and the
remedies of constructive trust, equitable lien, or accounting. The
plaintiff may also be able to recover the value of the use of his
property by the defendant.
If the defendant obtained value from the plaintiff in the form
of services, restitution in specie, of course, is not possible. The
plaintiff may, however, recover the reasonable value of his services through the common count of work and labor performed
(quantum meruit). Services, too, may sometimes be traced into
a specific asset, in which case the plaintiff's restitution may take
the form of an interest in that asset or an accounting for its
proceeds.
The decisions in cases granting or withholding these remedies may be couched in terms of contract or trust: a contract may
be "implied-in-law" or a constructive trust may "arise." But in
modern analysis, such terms really mean that the court has found
a remediable unjust enrichment. In short, if a court allows restitution, it does so because the defendant has received a cognizable
benefit; the benefit was at the plaintiff's expense; and the defendant's retention of it was unjustified. The modern law of restitution is, in the main, the elaboration of these three fundamental
elements. 22
In examining the first of these three elements-"benefit"-in
the relations of unmarried couples, we must assume that it cannot include sexual companionship. The courts have uniformly
held that sexual services cannot supply the consideration for even
an express contract. 23 Certainly, then, courts will not treat sexual
services as the benefit in an unjust enrichment claim. Household
services, however, are economically valuable, and despite the dif22. See 1 G. PALMER, supra note 20, §§ 1.7-.8.
23. Some courts have reasoned that such a contract, no matter how described, is
essentially one of prostitution. See, e.g., Naimo v. LaFianza, 146 N.J. Super. 362, 370-72,
369 A.2d 987, 991-93 (Ch. Div. 1976).
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ficulty of precisely assessing that value, its transfer can certainly
supply the benefit. 24
As to the second element, the plaintiff in a cohabitation case
may have trouble establishing that the benefit was supplied at his
expense or detriment. If the services were only what the plaintiff
wouid have done had he not lived with the defendant, one might
argue that the defendant did not acquire the benefit at the plaintiffs expense, since the plaintiff received full value in the form
of the benefits he himself received. However, it normally is more
burdensome to keep house for two than for one, and so, in most
cases where the plaintiffs role in the relationship was to keep
house, the plaintiff can probably show a real expenditure of services for the defendant's benefit. If the value of those beneficial
services exceeds the value of the benefits received from the defendant-in goods or services-a court may appropriately allow the
plaintiff to recover for the defendant's net benefit.
The most troublesome problem in applying restitution principles to the situation of unmarried couples lies in the third"unjustness"-element. Not all uncompensated benefits are
unjust enrichment. If one confers a benefit with donative intent, the recipient's retention ~f it cannot, of course, be called
unjustified. Basically, our law deems an enrichment unjust if
neither the terms of a valid contract or other legal transaction,
nor any overriding social policy, can explain its retention. 25
In most restitution cases, the defendant has acquired his
benefit tortiously, 26 in breach of contract, 'J:l through a contract or
gift which subsequently was rescinded, 28 under an unenforceable
contract (e.g., because.of the plaintiffs breach or the Statute of
Frauds), 29 or through certain mistakes by the plaintiff (such as
paying the defendant a debt not owed or a debt owed to a third
24. See Bruch, supra note 7, at 110-14; Havighurst, Services in the Home, 41 YALE
L.J. 386, 398-99 (1932).
25. J. DAWSON, UNJUST ENRICHMENT 127-28 (1951).
26. Restitution has been recognized as an alternative remedy for some torts since the
concept of "waiving the tort and suing in assumpsit" was recognized in the early English
case of Lamine v. Dorell, 2 Ld. Raym. 1216, 92 Eng. Rep. 303 (K.B. 1705). See generally
1 G. PALMER, supra note 20, ch. 2.
27. See Comment, ~estitution-Availability as anAltemative Remedy Where Plain•
tiff Has Fully Performed a Contract To Provide Goods or Services, 57 MICH. L. REv. 268
(1958). See generally 1 G. PALMER, supra note 20, ch. 4.
28. A contract may be rescinded for such causes as misrepresentation, mistake, duress, fundamental breach, or incapacity of one of the parties. See D. DOBBS, supra note
21, at 254-56. Restitution in cases involving inter vivos gifts and testamentary transfers is
throughly covered in 4 G. PALMER, supra note 20, chs. 18-20.
29. See generally 2 G. PALMER, supra note 20, ch.6.
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party). 30 Sometimes the plaintiff can recover a benefit which
should have gone to him but which the defendant acquired from
a third party. 31 In some situations the plaintiff may even recover
for benefits he voluntarily conferred upon the defendant without
the latter's request. 32
Most of these common kinds of cases clearly manifest the
facts that tend to make the defendant's retention of benefits unjust. If in acquiring the benefit the defendant acted in a way the
law independently characterizes as wrongful (e.g., tortiously or in
breach of contract of fiduciary duty), the unjustness is easily
established. The unjustness of a benefit conferred in part performance of a validly rescinded contract or gift is also readily
apparent. The law requires the parties to restore the status quo
ante, and so the defendant cannot justify retaining the benefit.
By drawing from these common restitution cases analogies to
claims for services rendered to a cohabitant, we should in some
situations easily find indicia of unjustness. If, for instance, the
defendant induced the plaintiff to enter the relationship-or to
remain in it-by a broken promise (e.g., of marriage), by a misrepresentation of material facts (e.g., present marital status), or
by duress, then the defendant could not justly retain benefits
obtained through that actively wrongful conduct. 33 If, for another
instance, the defendant did not knowingly misrepresent material
facts, but a mistaken belief regarding such facts induced the
plaintiff to enter the relationship, the enrichment of the defendant by the plaintiff's services can still be called unjust without
departing far from analogous precedents relating to the rescission
of mistaken gifts. A unilateral mistake on the donor's part will
usually warrant a rescission if the donor would not otherwise have
made the gift.34 Upon rescission, the donee's retention of the gift
becomes unjustifiable, and if the gift was of services, the donee
can be required to pay a reasonable value. That approach to the
question of unjustness underlies the cases allowing one putative
spouse to recover from another or from his estate upon discovering the invalidity of the marriage.35
However, we are considering couples who know they are not
30. See 3 id. § 14.8.
31. See 4 id. § 21.5.
32. See 2 id. ch. 10.
33. See, e.g., Marsh v. Marsh, 79 Cal. App. 560, 250 P. 411 (1926); Mbcer v. Mixer, 2
Cal. App. 227, 83 P. 273 (1905); Higgins v. Breen, 9 Mo. 497 (1845); Saunders v. Ragan,
172 N.C. 612, 90 S.E. 777 (1916); In re Fox's Estate, 178 Wis. 369, 190 N.W. 90 (1922).
34. See 4 G. PALMER, supra note 20, § 18.2, at 8.
35. Id. § 18.3.
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married and whose mistake differs from that in the putativemarriage cases. Moreover, in a putative marriage, there will be
additional indicia of unjustness. Either the putative husband will
have known the wife's mistake and have taken advantage of it,
or he will have thought himself validly married and accordingly
will have expected to incur financial obligations from the relationship. Either possibility more clearly evinces the unjustness of
an uncompensated retention (or an accrual to the estate) of the
cohabitant's beneficial services than does the situation of a couple who knew they were not married. A comparable fundamental
mistake may have induced the plaintiff to enter a nonmarital
relationship, but the defendant, unlike the putative husband,
may have had no reason to anticipate financial obligations. Nevertheless, the donee of any voidable gift who cannot return the
gift in specie and who must therefore return its value may similarly have anticipated no obligations. 36 Analogous precedent,
then, supports the conclusion that retaining the benefit of services may be unjust if one cohabitant performed them for the
other because of a fundamental mistake. ,
However, the typical modem cohabitation probably more
closely resembles the relationship envisioned in the letter to Dear
Abby. The parties cohabit fully aware of the relevant facts, and
the indicia of unjustness found in the fraud, duress, and mistake
circumstances are therefore absent. Even if the parties did not .
actually agree about the transfer of benefits from one to the other,
they probably contemplated that the benefits they would receive-material and non-material-would offset the burdens they
undertook. Neither party anticipated paying for the material
benefits received from the other except by contributing to the
relationship. Each party understood that the material benefit
received would depend upon what the other chose to contribute.
Under those assumptions, neither party's contributions could
unjustly enrich the other..Fully aware, they chose not to undertake the obligations of formal marriage, thus foregoing the legal
rights of marriage as well. They chose not to specify their mutual
rights and obligations in an actual contract or a partnership or
36. The court in Pickslay v. Starr, 149 N.Y. 432, 44 N.E. 163, 27 N.Y.S. 616 (1896),
in denying restitution to the donor, expressed concern that the recipient of a mistaken gift
might have already spent the money and might therefore find it a hardship if ordered to
repay. This concern, however, seems more appropriately analyzed as a ground for avoidance of liability rather than as indicating the absence of "unjustness" in the enrichment.
Cf. 4 G. PALMER, supra note 20, § 18.2, at 9 (the possible prejudice to the donee of a
voidable giR who must make restitution necessitates that clear proof be given that the
gift resulted from a mistake, but does not invalidate mistake as a ground for rescission).
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trust agreement. If one party becomes dissatisfied with the arrangement or feels that he is giving more than receiving, the
remedy is to give less, or simply to stop giving-to end the relationship.
That solution is not always easy, however. When one party
works in the marketplace and the other in the home, they may
not be free-or equally free-to end their association. Breaking
off the relationship normally would not seriously harm the breadwinner economically, but the one who keeps house could lose all
economic support. That might well deter him from ending, or
even jeopardizing, the association, even if he considers the support he receives disproportionate to his contribution. But without
a contract or unconscionable conduct by the other party, how
could he, when the relationship ends, call the other's enrichment
unjust?
The Marvin court apparently felt that the presumption "that
the parties intend to deal fairly with each other" 37 answers that
question. That presumption implies that if, as the relationship
develops, one party regularly receives economic benefits disproportionate to his contributions, the imbalance will somehow be
corrected. At some point in such a situation, the person keeping
house may abandon his essentially donative motivation and expect some tangible recompense for continuing to perform beneficial services. If the imbalance is substantial, the other party
should realize that the one at home serves with that expectation
even if the couple never actually agreed to it. As to indicia of
unjustness, the cohabitants' situation at that point begins to resemble some unsolicited-benefit situations in which the plaintiff,
without a donative intent and without any request from the defendant, knowingly confers a benefit on the latter.
In unsolicited-benefit cases, unjustness is most elusive, for
while the defendant will have received a windfall at the plaintiff's
expense, that alone does not make the retention of the benefit
unjustified when the plaintiff knowingly and intentionally made
the transfer. Anglo-American courts have resisted obligating a
defendant to pay someone he did not deal with-and may not
have wanted to deal with-for something he did not order, may
not have wanted, and perhaps could not afford. 38 The courts have
37. See 18 Cal. 3d at 683, 557 P.2d at 121, 134 Cal. Rptr. at 830 (paraphrasing J.
Peters' dissent in Keene v. Keene, 57 Cal. 2d 657, 674, 371 P.2d 329, 339, 21 Cal. Rptr.,
593, 603 (1962)).
38. See generally 2 G. PALMER, supra note 20, ch. 10; Dawson, Negotiorum Gestio:
The Altruistic Intermeddler (pts. 1-2), 74 HARV. L. REV. 817, 1073 (1961); Hope,
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not regarded sympathetically a plaintiffs voluntary intrusion
into the defendant's affairs, even when an altruistic concern for
the defendant's welfare motivated the plaintiff. Only where the
reason the plaintiff bestowed the benefit warrants interfering
with the defendant's autonomy will the courts consider the enrichment unjust and grant restitution. In analyzing unjustness,
then, courts inspect the plaintiffs motivation and the extent to
which restitution would infringe the defendant's freedom of
choice. 39
If the defendant can reject an unsolicited benefit without
harming himself, his accepting and keeping it without paying for
it may be unjustified even if he did not request it. 40 Whether a
court will find his retention unjust turns on the plaintiff's motivation and the defendant's understanding of that motivation. If the
plaintiff intended a gift, of course, the defendant incurs no obligation by accepting the benefit. If, on the other hand, the plaintiff
intended that the defendant pay for the value transferred, and
the defendant knew that when he accepted the benefit, the defendant normally cannot justify appropriating it to his beneficial use
without paying anything. 41 If the defendant did not understand
that the plaintiff expected payment, courts must take other facts
into account. Those facts would include the reason the plaintiff
acted as he did and the prejudice to the defendant that restitution would entail. If the plaintiff acted officiously, recovery is
unlikely; 42 if he acted to protect his own interests, recovery may
be permitted. A junior lienor who pays a defendant's debt to a
senior lienor to preserve property from loss, for instance, usually
can claim restitution in the form of subrogation. 43 In such a case,
the law can hardly disparage the junior lienor's motive, and allowing him restitution imposes no new burden ·on the defendant.
Although the defendant may have had no chance to refuse the
benefit, he cannot justify retaining it at the plaintiffs expense.
The benefit •in the cohabitants' situation, of course, often
consists of services, and the defendant may be unable to refuse
the benefit once the service has been rendered. And it is true that
Officiousness (pts. 1-2), 15 CORNELL L.Q. 25, 205 (1929-1930); Wade, Restitution for Benefits Conferred Without Request, 19 VAND. L. R.Ev. 1183 (1966).
39. See D. DOBBS, supra note 21, § 4.9.
40. 2 G. PALMER, supra note 20, § 10.10.
41. A federal statute, 39 U.S.C. § 3009 (1976), specifically permits the recipient of
unordered merchandise received through the mail to use it without obligation.
42. See the sources cited in note 38 supra. In particular, see Hope, at 27-29; Wade,
at 1184.
43. See 2 G. PALMER, supra note 20, § 10.5(a).
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courts are less likely to regard a retention of the benefit as unjust
in such cases than where the defendant had a choice. 44 But where
the defendant would inevitably have purchased the same service
anyway, requiring the defendant to pay for it simply obligates
him to pay the plaintiff an unavoidable expense. That situation
resembles the case of the junior lienor. Such an obligation may
interfere with the defendant's autonomy relatively slightly.
These principles might resolve the problem of unequal contributions in a modern cohabitation. Economic necessity does not
inhibit the marketplace laborer, as it does the party who works
at home, from leaving a relationship. Thus, by remaining in the
relationship and continuing to accept its material benefits, the
marketplace laborer can be said to have implicitly agreed to compensate the other or can be called unjustly enriched if he does not.
Even if the worker outside the home does not understand (as he
should) that the worker in the home expects more than he has
received, to the extent that the latter provides services which
satisfy basic human needs-food, clothing, shelter-the former
receives benefits that he himself would otherwise have to provide.
Requiring him to make restitution, therefore, would not force him
to pay for something he did not want and would not have procured from some source.
Requiring the marketplace laborer to make restitution for his
cohabitant's services, however, would force him to buy something
he might have supplied himself or been given by another source.
By analogy to unsolicited benefits, that he incurs an obligation
to pay without a choice among alternatives weakens the claim
that he has been unjustly enriched, for the plaintiff in an
unsolicited-benefit case generally may not recover if he could
have allowed the defendant to choose someone else to supply the
service. 45 For example, while a physician who, unrequested, renders necessary medical aid in an emergency may recover the reasonable value of his services, 45 he may not recover if no emergency
prevented him from securing the defendant's consent.
However, that analogy should not be pressed too far. By
hypothesis, the home worker does not volunteer services gratuitously, and the other party receives nothing he did not seek. The
beneficiary resembles the recipient of an unsolicited benefit. He
may not have actually understood that his benefactor expected
payment, but if the presumption of the expectation of fair dealing
44. See id. § 10.lO(b), at 461.
45. See fu:sTATEMENT OF REsTITIJTION § 113, Comment f (1937).
46. See id. § 116; Greenspan v. Slate, 12 N.J. 426, 97 A.2d 390 (1953),
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is valid, he should have realized he would incur some obligation
should the mutual contributions fall into serious disequilibrium.
Being relatively freer to terminate the association, he does have
a choice of sorts. Thus, requiring restitution may be appropriate.
In the abstract, this analysis seems sensible if we ascribe to
the cohabitants the expectation of "fair dealing" (and forget that
that ascription may be fictitious). In reality, however, we merely
substitute one vague conception (fair dealing) for another (unjust
enrichment). We need indicia of "fairness" to determine when
the contributions fall out of balance and what the defendant's
resulting obligation should be. When the cohabitation arrangement contemplates from its inception that each party's contribution, rather than money or other objectively definable value, will
supply the quid pro quo for the other party's contribution, no easy
formula can indicate when the contributions are too unequal to
be "fair." Analogies drawn from common restitution cases, therefore, probably cannot identify an unjust enrichment except where
that disparity is extreme. But, in any event, perhaps that is the
only situation in which the courts ought to involve themselves.
When extreme disparity occurs, however, some form of restitution should be available. If the plaintiff seeks a money judgment in quantum meruit, placing a dollar value on the parties'
contributions will be difficult. One court has held that a jury can
fix the value by drawing upon its general knowledge of the worth
of such things.47 Relying upon the jury's sense of reasonableness
may be appropriate in a suit for damages from pain and suffering,
which lack objective criteria entirely, but such reliance is questionable where the action seeks monetary recovery for an economic benefit. Tµere is a market for household services, 48 and
market value should basically determine the amount of enrichment. Admittedly, services lovingly·performed by a resident
housekeeper are probably more desirable than those of a domestic
servant, but such subjective values have never been weighed in
restitutionary recovery.
Unmarried cohabitants seem to seek money awards for their
services less frequently than they claim a share of the defendant's
property. The cases that allow relief in the form of property to one
who contributed primarily household services usually do so pursuant to an express or implied-in-fact agreement (including a
47. Lovinger v. Anglo Cal. Natl. Bank, 243 P.2d 561, 567-68 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App.1952)
(allowed only for express contract).
48. See Bruch, supra note 7, at 110-14; see generally Havighurst, supra note 24.
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resulting trust). 0 A few cases, however, have indicated that in the
absence of an agreement, such a remedy may be predicated on
unjust enrichment principles. 50 Traditionally, restitution in the
form of an interest in specific property for benefits conferred in a
different form has depended upon the plaintiff's ability to trace
the benefit actually conferred through successive transformations
directly into the specific asset sought. Gl One can trace a benefit
in the form of money,· for instance, into a bank account, from
there into corporate stock purchased from the account, and from
there into real estate for which the stock was exchanged. Tracing
is obviously more difficult when the benefit consists of services
rendered not to the specific property, but to the defendant personally. Arguably, the plaintiff's beneficial services permitted
the defendant to expend on the specific property some funds or
energies he otherwise would have spent for the services, and thus
the plaintiff may trace the services to the property. The law of
restitution does not permit this sort of indirect tracing in other
situations, however.
A si:nnlar argument in favor of tracing-and involving similarly indirect tracing-suggests that the beneficial household
services enhance the economic worth of the defendant himself
and thus contribute to the defendant's every economic decision,
including his purchases of property. The services could even be
said to contribute to the defendant's present and future earning
capacity and thus to justify a constructive trust against not only
presently held property, but future income as well. 52 This rationale essentially duplicates that of the law directing the division
of property acquired during marriage when formally married couples divorce.
Whether the same analysis should apply to both married and
unmarried couples is questionable. In an actual marriage, spouses
exchange not only economic but subjective spiritual and emotional values as well. Marriage implies equal sharing of burdens
and benefits, and the courts and legislatures recognize that. The
courts have extended that implication to the situation of putative
spouses who live together for an extended period mistakenly believing they are actually married, an appropriate extension in
49. See Annot., 31 A.L.R.2d 1255 (1953).
60. See Hager v. Hager, 553 P.2d 919 (Alaska 1976); Carlson v. Olson,_ Minn.
- , 256 N.W.2d 249 (1977); Omer v. Omer, 11 Wash. App. 386, 523 P.2d 957 (1974).
51. See RF.sTATEMENT OF RFsrmmoN § 160, Comment i (1937).
52. A similar suggestion is made in Kay & Amyx, supra note 7, at 964-65 (wife who
put husband through school has a constructive trust in the educational capital of her
graduated husband).
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view of the parties' expectations.53 The rights of knowingly unmarried couples, on the other hand, must, unless a new status is
recognized, spring from legal sources other than the law of marriage: basic principles of tort, contract, trust, property, and unjust enrichment. To allow the subjective, indirect tracing that the
rationale behind property division upon divorce entails would go
far beyond what cases permit where unjust enrichment is the
defendant's sole source of obligation. Courts could ignore tracing
and instead candidly recognize a "quasi-marriage" or "quasicommunity-property" relationship that enables one who contributed services to claim a share of property, but that would depart
even further from established principles of restitution and unjust
enrichment. To allow a knowingly unmarried party, iri the name
of unjust enrichment, the same right allowed a real or putative
spouse to claim property acquired by the other (in the absence of
an express or implied-in-fact agreement) is to recognize the new
"common law status" Dear Abby referred to.
The potential effect of such a status on the institution of
monogamous marriage, and on the society which has heretofore
believed that institution fundamental, is a profoundly significant
issue. Its implications transcend the interests of particular parties
and outstrip the ability of a lawsuit-where the adversaries frame
the issues and supply the evidence-to consider them adequately.
The legislative process is much better equipped to resolve such
questions, although it too is seriously handicapped when dealing
with issues as emotional and symbolic as the future of marriage.
That some courts have been persuaded to assist a person who
worked at home to recover a share of his cohabitant's property
after a stable, long-term, knowingly unmarried relationship
strongly suggests that some new legal status ought to be recognized. At least one state legislature has recognized an unmarried
cohabitant's claim to a share of the partner's property upon the
partner's death. 54 fu view of the growing numbers who choose to
live together unmarried, other states' legislatures cannot long ignore the need to resolve property claims that arise when such
relationships terminate. fu the meantime, the unmarried cohabitants are well-advised to provide privately, by agreement, their
own solutions. fu the absence of such agreements, unjust enrichment principles may be resorted to in some cases. The plaintiff
53. See, e.g., Schneider v. Schneider, 183 Cal. 335. 191 P. 533 (1920); Werner v.
Werner, 59 Kan. 399, 53 P. 127 (1898). See generally Evans, Property Interests Arising
from Quasi-Marital Relations, 9 CORNELL L.Q. 246, 254-61 (1924).
54. N.H. REv.

STAT.

ANN. § 457:39 (1968).
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whose economic contribution to the relationship was primarily of
household services may find it hard to establish unjust enrichment, but not impossible if the Marvin court's presumption of an
expectation of fair dealing is accepted. Where the relationship
lasted a long time, where the plaintiff contributed services the
defendant would otherwise have had to provide for himself, where
the economic value the- plaintiff gave and received differed
greatly, and where the plaintiff's economic dependence inhibited
his freedom to end the relationship, the defendant's enrichment
can be considered unjustified.
A money recovery in the amount by which the value of the
plaintiff's services exceeded the support and other economic
value the plaintiff received may be appropriate in such cases and
would not depart widely from precedents in analogous cases. Restitution in the form of a share of property is another matter.
Allowing such a remedy where household services were the benefit would strain established notions of tracing. If that remedy is
recognized, it should be und~rstood as a feature of a new status,
not as a product of the general law of restitution. 55 And if that
status is to be recognized, the legislatures, not the courts should
do so.56
55. Washington cases seem to recognize that, even absent legislation, community
property rights can be acquired through a stable, long-term meretricious relationship. See
In re Estate of Thornton, 81 Wash. 2d 72, 499 P.2d 864 (1972) (dicta); 53 WASH. L. REV.
145, 168-69 (1977).
56. Postscript: On April 17, 1979, the California Supreme Court announced its decision in Marvin v. Marvin. It found no contract-express or implied; it found no
trust-actual, constructive, or resulting; nevertheless, it awarded the plaintiff $104,000
"for rehabilitation purposes, so that she may have the economic means to educate herself
and to learn new, employable skills • . . and so that she may return from her status as
companion of a motion picture star to a separate but perhaps more prosaic existence."
Los Angeles Daily Journal, April 19, 1979, at 10. The only justification offered by the court
was a reference to footnote 25 of the California Supreme Court's Marvin decision, 18 Cal.
3d at 685, 557 P.2d at 123, 134 Cal. Rptr. at 832, which it said authorized trial courts to
employ "whatever equitable remedy may be proper under the circumstances."
It is impossible to contemplate a remedy, equitable or otherwise, apart from a right.
One may thus wonder where the substantive right to "rehabilitation" came from. The
findings of the court exclude the possibility that the right stemmed from unjust enrichment or from a contract to share in the defendant's earnings. No express finding was
made, however, relating to a contract for the rehabilitation of the plaintiff at the termination of the relationship. Perhaps the court found an implied contract deriving from the
"exp'ectation of fair dealing" recognized by the California Supreme Court. See text at note
37 supra. If so, it would have been helpful if the court had made that clear.

